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The central point of Professor Snowden's note is that, in general, the 
capital inflows problem should be tackled by a combination of different 
policies. We fully agree with his assessment and, in fact, made it 
explicit in our IMF Staff Papers article: " ... there are grounds to support 
a mix of policy intervention based on the imposition of a tax on short-term 
capital imports, on enhancing the flexibility of exchange rates, and on 
raising marginal reserve requirements on short-term bank deposits" 
(Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, p. 149).
1  However, Professor Snowden's 
objection to our paper is perhaps that we discuss the pros and cons 
of each separate policy without taking into account their mutual interaction. 
We think this is a valid criticism although, to keep the record 
straight, it should be said that the paper did not intend to provide a 
complete discussion of the optimal policy response to capital inflows. In 
this reply we will offer some thoughts on this latter issue with the caveat 
that they represent just a first step into largely unexplored territory. 
As emphasized in our paper, no policy option is free of potential costs. 
Therefore, it is to be expected that an optimal policy package will involve 
more than one measure. The nature of such a policy package is, 
                                                 
1 In effect, the advisabi!ity of relying on a mix of complementary policy measures is also stressed  in the concluding 
remarks to Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993b). 
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however, much more difficult to determine. Laissez faire is not optimal 
because, as a general rule, countries exhibit static or dynamic distortions. 
Therefore, optimal policy should take explicit account of the relevant 
distortions characterizing a given economy. The statement above from 
our paper is, for instance, strongly conditioned by our feeling that 
government intervention should aim at preventing financial crises and 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate. 
The desirability of a policy mix does not imply that the policymaker 
should feel totally free to vary the mix. Ideally, policies should be designed 
to be responsive to exogenous factors-like terms of trade 
changes, earthquakes, and even wars-but the type and size of response 
should be well understood in advance. Otherwise, policy, by becoming 
"discretionary," constitutes an independent source of uncertainty, which 
only in rare circumstances could be expected to raise social welfare. 
Actually, if policymakers attempt to utilize their freedom to choose the 
policy mix to their (or even social) advantage on a regular basis, the public 
will learn to anticipate such behavior, and the resulting solution will be 
decidedly inferior to a (flexible but well understood and credible) rule set 
in advance. 
In practice, policy transparency is much harder to achieve. This is so 
for several reasons. Policy feasibility depends on political considerations 
that are hard to predict-if not, hard to verbalize. Flexible policies could 
be complex-and, hence, expensive to articulate and difficult to understand   3
by the general public-and such policies may induce a loss of 
credibility. This last point is important and deserves further elaboration. 
There exists a subtle line between flexible rules (set in advance) and 
"discretion." In both cases, the policymaker changes the policy mix in 
view of circumstances. Thus, the public may find it hard to distinguish 
between the two. In particular, when rules are mistaken for "discretion," 
it would be incorrect to apply the policy rule that would be optimal if the 
public believed that the policy maker will never resort to discretion. This 
is the reason why the choice of optimal rules should take into account the 
credibility of the rules themselves. 
For example, we suggest that it may be desirable, among other things, 
to increase exchange rate flexibility. However, this policy may not be 
optimal if the public interprets greater flexibility as a signal that policymakers 
have loosened their monetary discipline and are likely to resort 
to surprise exchange rate devaluations or appreciations. Actually, the 
more important are credibility-type considerations, the less flexible the 
policy mix is likely to be. Similarly, the levying of a tax on short-term 
capital inflows (a form of capital control) may not be advisable if a 
relatively young stabilization plan, which stresses liberalization and openness, 
is in effect. Such a measure could endanger the plan's credibility. 
Consequently, while fully agreeing with Professor Snowden that optimal 
policy will likely entail a combination of complementary measures, 
we believe that the characteristics of optimal policy will be heavily deter   4
mined by country-specific considerations. Approximating such an optimum- 
especially when a country has experienced an episode of high 
inflation or high indebtedness-requires the cool mind of an analyst, 
combined with the refined nose, keen eye, and sharp ears of a champion 
policymaker.   5
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